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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ARAGUAIA: MAOIST UPRISING AND MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY IN 
THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON, 1967-1975 
 
MAY 2015 
 
THAMYRIS F. T. ALMEIDA,  
 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
 
DIRECTED BY: PROFESSOR JOEL WOLFE 
 
This thesis argues that the Maoist guerrilla movement headed by members of the 
Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) chose Araguaia as the stage for its insurrection 
based on perceived ideological and physical advantages. It examines the founding of the 
PCdoB as it split from the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) over the issue of armed 
resistance in 1962. While the PCB did not promote the use of violence against the 
military dictatorship, the PCdoB sought an environment in which they could foster 
revolutionary fervor. Though the war’s longevity demonstrates that the PCdoB accurately 
assessed some camponeses’ willingness to help the guerrilheiros, their inability to foster 
loyalty within their ranks hindered the party’s mission. The movement’s leaders policed 
the bodies of pregnant guerrilla members and this lack of reproductive freedom led two 
members to abandon the revolutionary cause. Pedro Albuquerque Neto and his wife 
Tereza Cristina successfully abandoned detachment C in favor of keeping their child. 
Pedro was imprisoned in Fortaleza leading to the discovery of the guerrilla camps in 
Araguaia and the end to a revolution that never truly got off the ground. Thus, this thesis 
proposes that while the PCdoB’s choice in Araguaia was thought to garner the best 
 vi 
possible opportunity for a rural revolution, their mission to radicalize the camponeses 
was cut short by the Brazilian Armed Forces in April of 1972. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Teço, irmãos laborais, 
as guerrilhas e as esperanças, 
os versos e os romances da liberdade, 
a plena vida que o coração do homem ilumina. 
  
Não me matarão 
 
- Paulo Fonteles Filho, Osvaldão, o poema1 
 
I weave, labor brothers, 
the guerrilla wars and the hopes, 
the poetry and the romances of liberty, 
the full life that man’s heart lights. 
 
They will not kill me. 
 
- Paulo Fonteles FIlho, Osvaldão, o poema 
 
State-sanctioned violence is a reoccurring theme in the history of the United 
States and of several countries the U.S. has funded over its hegemonic reign. The United 
States government politically, financially, and militarily supported Brazil’s military 
dictatorship. From the American-owned Hanna Mining Company trucks that transported 
military soldiers to Rio de Janeiro for the coup, to the napalm dropped on Araguaia 
residents – the cooperation between (mostly U.S. American-owned) multinational 
companies, the U.S. government, and the Brazilian military had oppressive and traumatic 
consequences for the Brazilian people. The U.S-backed coup cannot be divorced from its 
Cold War context; João Goulart’s plan for agrarian reform threatened U.S. business                                                         
1 Paulo Fonteles Filho, “Osvaldão, o poema,” Fundação Maurício Grabois, published April 6, 2014, 
http://grabois.org.br/portal/noticia.php?id_sessao=53&id_noticia=13016. 
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interests in Brazil and this apparent socialist move disrupted a delicate class hierarchy in 
Brazilian society. From 1964 to 1985 those who showed opposition to the regime lived 
under constant intimidation and threat of force from those meant to defend them.  
 Resistance to the military dictatorship took many forms and lacked cohesion. 
Movements against the regime represented a variety of ideologies on the political 
spectrum. One of the more infamous displays of opposition was that by the Revolutionary 
Movement 8th of October known as MR-8. The Marxist-Leninist organization kidnapped 
American ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick, bringing national attention to grievances 
against the military regime. However, not all leftist movements advocated the use of arms 
in their opposition to state-sanctioned violence. Some members of the Catholic Church in 
Brazil embraced liberation theology during the dictatorship years and advocated for 
better treatment of and services for the Brazilian poor, which became increasingly 
politicized. For instance, clergy in the Araguaia region were persecuted alongside the 
communist guerrilla. The Maoist guerrilla movement in the Amazon shared similar 
preoccupations with the liberation theologists – the plight of Brazil’s poor and 
disenfranchised – however the Araguaia Guerrilla focused more narrowly on rural 
peasants whose limited options rendered them voiceless in the urban-centered 
movements.  
 Due to repressive censorship policies during the dictatorship, the history of the 
Araguaia Guerrilla War remains obscured despite its significance to twentieth century 
Brazil. Unlike other notable guerrilla movements, such as Vale do Ribeiro in São Paulo 
(1970) and Serrado Caparaó in Minas Gerais (1966), the three years of armed resistance 
in the Amazon basin by a group of Maoist-leaning communist guerrillas was heavily 
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censored despite its magnitude.2 While newspapers such as O Estado de São Paulo, 
Coojornal, and Movimento, managed to publish reports on the conflict, it was not until 
the Abertura that more substantive works on the topic began to surface.3 With the 
controlled liberalization, journalists were finally able to publish the findings they had 
accumulated about the Araguaia Guerilla. In their 1978 publication, the authors of A 
Guerrilha do Araguaia state, “Today the situation is different. Finally, we have the 
opportunity to publish the material patiently collected over five years.”4 These early 
reports provide important information on the active resistance to the military regime and, 
given the political affiliations of the guerrilla group, to imperialist capital in the Amazon 
basin.  
 While there exists ample secondary sources regarding this three-year long rural 
uprising, there are few English-based narratives on the history of Araguaia’s armed 
resistance.5 This thesis affirms that the location for the Partido Comunista do Brasil’s 
(Communist Party of Brazil - PCdoB) insurrection was not picked at random; rather, it 
was a highly calculated arrangement intended to garner the best possible chance of 
spurring a socialist revolution.6 Though other works mention the intentional choice of 
Araguaia in passing, they do not offer a complex study of the PCdoB’s pick for a Maoist 
                                                        
2 Palmério Dória, et al., A Guerrilha do Araguaia (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1978), 4. According to the 
authors’ note these guerrilla movements were “amply divulged by the press.” 
3 The Abertura was the formal political opening begun by the Geiseil government in 1977. 
4 Dória, A Guerrilha do Araguaia, 4.  
5 Various English-writing scholars have mentioned Araguaia in their various works dealing with Brazil’s 
military dictatorship. However, there are no works in the field of history that focuses solely on this 
movement. Jeffrey Lesser includes a chapter on the deaths of Sueli Rumiko Ramayana and André 
Massafumi Yoshinaga in Jeffrey Lesser, A Discontented Diaspora: Japanese Brazilians and the Meanings 
of Ethnic Militancy, 1960-1980 (Durham: Duke University, 2007). 
6 For brief mentions of the PCdoB choice of Araguaia, see Rubim Santos Leão de Aquino and Regilena 
Carvalho, Araguaia: da guerrilha ao genocídio (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Multifoco, 2011), 39. See also, 
Romualdo Pessoa Campos Filho, Guerrilha do Araguaia: A Esquerda em Armas (Goiânia: Universidade 
Federal de Goiás, 2003), 79. 
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uprising. By tracing the physical and ideological aspects of the party’s decision, I analyze 
the characteristics thought to be most advantageous for fostering social change.  
Section one explores the ideological reasoning for staging a rural insurrection in 
Araguaia. It charts the development of the PCdoB as a distinctly Maoist communist 
party, with an emphasis on opposition to U.S. imperialism in Brazil. This ideological 
stance, coupled with the presence of U.S.-based multinational corporations in the area, 
led to the choice of Araguaia as an optimal location for a communist uprising. This first 
section analyzes the political development of the PCdoB as its members splintered off 
from the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party - PCB) in favor of a 
violent uprising for a socialist transition in the early 1960s. Drawing on documents 
produced by the communist party, I deduce that the choice of Araguaia was based on its 
large population of poor camponeses, the lack of government attention to the area and 
police brutality in the region. Though these factors fostered social grievances among the 
rural and mostly poor residents of Araguaia, the guerrillas overestimated the camponeses’ 
willingness to join the movement. Section two expands on communist ideology regarding 
U.S. imperialism in the context of Araguaia. It focuses on the presence of U.S.-based 
multinational corporations (encouraged by the military dictatorship) as an essential aspect 
to the rural struggle. This section utilizes the Jari Project, an expansive business venture 
by American billionaire Daniel K. Ludwig, as a case study detailing the context of U.S. 
imperialism in the region. Thus, it includes a narrative of a multi-faceted resistance: to 
both foreign labor exploitation and a domestic authoritarian government.  
The following section highlights the physical aspects of Araguaia the PCdoB 
believed would aid their guerrilla movement. These advantages included: familiarity with 
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the terrain, knowledge of natural resources necessary to survive in the forest, protection 
from heavy artillery due to thick density of the jungle, and a vast space into which the 
guerrillas could escape. It concludes that the landscape proved a significant obstacle to 
the Brazilian armed forces. With a total of approximately eighty-nine militants (including 
the camponeses), the Guerrilha do Araguaia resisted military attacks from 1972 to 1975, 
a significant feat for such a small group. This endeavor involved three military campaigns 
and mobilized twenty thousand men; a size comparable to the Brazilian Expeditionary 
Forces sent to fight for the Allies in Europe during World War II.7 Such a large 
movement of troops, coupled with intense censorship on the subject as a means of 
discouraging similar uprisings elsewhere in Brazil, indicates that the regime viewed the 
potential of a communist uprising in Araguaia as a serious threat. By 1975 the majority of 
the PCdoB militants was captured, tortured, and/or killed by the military. Though the 
party accurately analyzed the environmental advantages of Araguaia, the guerrillas were 
attacked before fully realizing their ideological mission — radicalizing the people and 
eventually inciting the masses into a prolonged popular uprising. 
 I use the term Araguaia to signify the general area wherein the PCdoB militants 
set up their camps and social networks. This space encompassed towns in three different 
states, Pará, Maranhão, and what is today Tocantins, connected by a series of Amazon 
tributaries, including the Araguaia River. The mineral wealth located between the 
Araguaia and Tocantins rivers drew foreign and multinational companies to the region. 
Their presence provoked tensions regarding work conditions, an important concern to the 
communist cause. Thus, this community also became a refuge for the militants who had                                                         
7 Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985), 121-122. 
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previous skirmishes with the law, such as Helenira Resende de Souza Nazareth, vice-
president of the União Nacional dos Estudantes (National Student Union - UNE).8  
                                                        
8 Helenira Resende was imprisoned along with 800 other students at the 30th UNE Congress in Ibiúna, São 
Paulo. See Bruno Ribeiro, Helenira Resende e A Guerrilha do Araguaia (São Paulo: Editora Expressão 
Popular, 2007), 23. Resende was also one of the few women to take on a leadership role in the student 
movement, she was one of multiple vice-presidents of the UNE, see Victoria Langland, Speaking of 
Flowers: Student Movements and the Making and Remembering of 1968 in Military Brazil (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013), 138. 
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9 Figure 1: Map of Araguaia region. Source: Guerrilheiras do Araguaia. 
 
                                                        
9 This map was drawn up by the military and referenced in a letter from Captain Hamilton Ribeiro 
Saldanha de Mendes, “Operação Cigana,” pg. 5, in which he says says that lack of familiarity slowed down 
the mission as distances were often incorrectly estimated. 
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An investigation of Araguaia’s role in communist resistance in Brazil places politics in 
the context of geographic spaces. The various students, PCdoB leaders, and communist-
affiliated peoples who fought in Araguaia expanded the term’s association from a river 
and region to a guerrilla war — one of the most important armed movements in rural 
Brazil. 
  
 9 
CHAPTER 2 
IDEOLOGY FROM PRESTES TO ARAGUAIA 
 
  Founded in 1922, the Partido Comunista Brasileiro was highly influenced by the 
success of the Russian revolution and remained within the Communist International’s 
(Comintern) sphere of influence until party tensions peaked in 1962. Ronald Chilcote 
chronicles the party’s extensive history in his work The Brazilian Communist Party: 
Conflict and Integration 1922-1972; his analysis of the PCB’s history demonstrates the 
volatile nature of the party’s legality, specifically during the Cold War era. While at times 
the party operated from the margins of society, it actively worked to improve the rights 
and amplify the voices of rural laborers. During a brief period of legality, 1945-1947, 
party leader Luis Carlos Prestes campaigned for the election of PCB members running an 
electoral program that demanded agrarian reform, a new democratic constitution, and 
support for the United Nations.10 As newly-elected members of the Constituent 
Assembly, PCB candidates criticized President Eurico Gaspar Dutra and his government 
for their efforts to attract foreign investment; such criticisms led to suppression of party 
activities, culminating with the outlawing of the PCB on May 7, 1947.11  
 Operating as a clandestine organization, the PCB adopted a revolutionary stance 
that was partly shaped by the Cold War, in that member theorists considered U.S.-Brazil 
relations to be semi-colonial in nature. The theses of the PCB’s Fourth Congress point to 
                                                        
10 These elections were held in 1945 and although Eurico Gaspar Dutra received 55% of the presidential 
votes the PCB received the largest party votes in industrial cities and state capitals making them Dutra’s 
most formidable opposition. See, Ronald H. Chilcote, The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and 
Integration 1922-1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 51-52. 
11 The illegalization of the PCB was also a response to the U.S. who pushed to eliminate communism from 
the hemisphere. Cliff Welch, “Keeping Communism Down on the Farm: The Brazilian Rural Labor 
Movement during the Cold War,” Latin American Perspectives 33 (2006): 29. See also, Chilcote, Brazilian 
Communist Party, 53.  
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a policy shift reflecting increased tensions between the communist and non-communist 
worlds. More specifically, such a shift meant greater antagonism towards capitalist 
governments and a more militant opposition to U.S. imperialism.12 This perspective also 
emphasized the connection between imperialism and the persistence of a “backward state 
of development bordering on feudalism” in Brazil.13 It called for a break from 
imperialist, resource-extractive, corporations so as to restructure Brazil’s agricultural 
sector in favor of supporting a domestic market. Despite a common anti-imperialist 
viewpoint, members of the PCB disagreed on the method for combating rural labor 
exploitation. Luis Carlos Prestes first advocated the use of violence in his 1950 August 
Manifesto; however, ten years later the party (once again) shifted its stance towards the 
peaceful models supported by the USSR.14 Chilcote asserts that, “the strategy of relying 
on all social strata from the urban proletariat to the national bourgeoisie stemmed from 
the Soviet Communist Party’s renewed emphasis on moderate reformist movements as 
appropriate to all dependent societies.”15 Thus, the PCB’s history was volatile both 
politically and ideologically, reflecting Cold War relations on a broader scale.  
 These constant alterations led to a major party split by the PCB’s Fifth Congress. 
At this time, party dissidents who disagreed with the Soviet policy of  “peaceful 
coexistence” turned to Communist China for guidance. Among them were João 
Amazonas, Maurício Grabois, Ângelo Arroyo, and Pedro Pomar, important leaders in 
what became the PCdoB. These dissidents defended the path of violence while notable 
figures such as Luis Carlos Pretes, Gioconda Dias, and Astrojildo Pereira upheld the need                                                         
12 Chilcote, Brazilian Communist Party, 54-55. The fourth congress was originally scheduled for May 23, 
1947 but was postponed due to the party’s illegal status. 
13 Welch, “Keeping Communism Down on the Farm,” 30. 
14 Ibid., 30, 33. 
15 Chilcote, Brazilian Communist Party, 64. 
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for peaceful coexistence.16 The two factions officially split in 1962, though both parties 
continued to focus on the plight of rural farmers and agricultural workers, specifically at 
the hands of multinational corporations. The newly constituted PCdoB distanced itself 
from the Soviet Union and turned towards the communist regime in China; this 
relationship promoted violent rural resistance as opposed to peaceful social change.  In 
1966, the PCdoB sent fifteen militants to China in order to undergo technical guerrilla 
training at the Military Academy in Beijing. These guerrillas believed that the 
contradictions of capitalism and conflicts stemming from social inequality coupled with 
abuses from the dictatorship justified the use of violence against the regime.17 Along with 
physical training, the PCdoB militants also engaged in practical and theoretical courses 
regarding field combat, which emphasized the importance of a mass popular uprising. 
Thus, in 1969 the PCdoB’s central committee officially approved of a violent 
insurrection in its resolution entitled Guerra Popular - Caminho da Luta Armada no 
Brasil.18 
 Following the lead of the Chinese Revolution, the PCdoB was intent on 
generating a fight for the people; thus the importance of a rural setting for the 
insurrection. Drawing on Maoism and Che Guevara’s writings (the concept of foquismo), 
the communists considered the disenfranchised peoples of Araguaia to be the source of 
the revolution’s legitimacy. In their evaluation of Araguaia’s ability to sustain a 
revolution, documented in “Copy of the PCdoB’s Study For the Implementation of the 
Rural Guerrilla War in Araguaia (1968-1972),” the unknown author(s) stresses the                                                         
16 Taís Morais and Eumano Silva, Operação Araguaia: Os Arquivos Secretos da Guerrilha (São Paulo: 
Geração Editorial, 2005), 34. See also, Romualdo Pessoa Campos Filho, Guerrilha do Araguaia: A 
Esquerda em Armas (Goiânia: Editora UFG, 1997), 82. 
17 Morais and Silva, Operação Araguaia, 28. 
18 Ibid., 35. 
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importance of the land and its population. It asserts that the party’s two strategic tasks in 
the region were to ensure it’s own survival and guarantee constant growth.19 While the 
resource-rich landscape facilitated survival, the large population living on the margins of 
society provided a potential support system and social network.  
 The extreme poverty in the Araguaia region, due to labor exploitation and 
government neglect, led party leaders to deem it highly susceptible to subversive 
ideology. The author(s) goes into a detailed explanation of the socio-economic conditions 
of the area in their study of Araguaia, heralding the poor migrant population as a key 
factor in the guerrilla movements’s success. The document describes the migrants from 
northeastern states, the nordestinos, as pauper-like, lacking any kind of assistance and 
living on dispersed roças (small, subsistence-level, rural households).20 The possibility of 
radicalizing the economically oppressed peoples of the region meant that, through family 
ties stretching across northern Brazil, the PCdoB could eventually mobilize a mass 
popular army. While the assertion that the region was plagued with poverty and virtually 
ignored by the federal government is not particularly far-fetched, it is important to 
question the extent to which such a description was projected onto the peasant population 
in Araguaia. Perhaps the communists’ view of the power relations within this community 
was substantial reason for a call to arms, however the voices of those native to the area 
would have strengthened the PCdoB’s claim to the necessity of an uprising. 
 The camponeses were, in fact, poor and desolate; their livelihood was neither 
guaranteed nor secure. A considerable number of those living just outside the small cities 
came from the northeastern states of Brazil where food and jobs were (and still are)                                                         
19 “Copia do Estudo do PCdoB Para A Implantação da Guerrilha Rural do Araguaia (1968-1972),” undated, 
p. 44. 
20 “Copy of the Study,” p. 43. 
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scarce due to frequent periods of drought. For people like Joaquim Rodrigues Araujo the 
jungle was pure and empty, it provided opportunities for unobstructed subsistence 
whether by farming or simply gathering the fruits of the forest.21 Once in Araguaia, these 
people became a part of the subsistence economy or found employment as seasonal 
workers of various sorts. Some of the more notable seasonal jobs in the area included 
picking castanhas (chestnuts), working on cattle breeding farms, or in wood extraction – 
notoriously exploitative jobs.22 Given the oppressive economic environment and the high 
population of those living in poverty, the PCdoB felt that the residents’ only option was a 
revolution.23 Once again, the assertion that there was a lack of alternate solutions to the 
peasants’ abject poverty appears to be projected onto the population of Araguaia. The 
PCdoB’s study for the implementation of guerrilla warfare in Araguaia obscures the 
agency of the very people they aim to liberate from their assumed state of oppression.  
Agency is both important and illusive in this narrative. Despite bearing witness to 
(and bearing the brunt of) the militarization of Araguaia, the local residents are absent 
from both the PCdoB’s study of the region and military reports regarding the 
counterinsurgency. However, journalists, researchers and human rights organizations 
have been working to uncover those voices since the early 1990s. At first, every 
humanitarian, academic, or media interviews conducted in the area was followed by 
military presence and a separate investigation into the information being divulged. This 
show of intimidation, and ultimately force, did not always keep residents for talking and 
                                                        
21 Camponeses describe how they arrived at Araguaia and reminisce their lives pre-militarization of the 
region in Camponeses do Araguaia: a Guerrilha vista por dentro, documentary, directed by Vandré 
Fernandes (2011; São Paulo: Fundação Maurício Grabois). 
22 The PCdoB makes this claim in “Copy of the Study,” p. 3 however residents interviewed in the 
documentary Camponeses do Araguaia: a Guerrilha vista por dentro echo this sentiment.  
23 Ibid. 
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did eventually subside as the conflict in Araguaia became harder to deny. Indeed, 
Professor Romualdo Pessoa Campos Filhos has noticed an increasing willingness, on 
behalf of the Araguaia residents, to discuss the guerrilha.24 For the past twenty years the 
presence of news trucks in the region has been anything but a novelty; thus while the 
camponeses remain subaltern in the documents produced by both the PCdoB and the 
military, their voices have been amplified in contemporary media.  
Though the guerrilla movement consisted of mostly middle-class college students 
trying to speak for the poor and working poor in Araguaia, it accurately portrays the 
residents’ marginalization. The Araguaians confirm their precarious financial situation in 
a recent documentary produced by the Maurício Grabois Foundation. Araguaia at that 
time was a nascent community as most of the residents were part of a migratory 
peasantry in search of land who had settled in the region between the late 1950s and into 
the late 1960s.25 Coming from poor communities around the Brazilian Northeast, the 
Araguaians maintained a humble lifestyle. Their communities lacked doctors, medical 
supplies and teachers. Social services that the guerrilla helped fulfill.26 Such 
contributions did, as predicted by the PCdoB leadership, cultivate close ties between the 
guerrilheiros and the local populations of Marabá, Xambioá, and Imperatriz.  
 While the militant party members’ motives are seemingly admirable, they also 
convey a rather patronizing perception of the rural peasantry. The PCdoB’s assessment of 
rural guerrilla warfare as a means of advancing the socialist agenda stresses the 
                                                        
24 Romualdo Pessoa first notes this change in 1996 and echoes the statement in an interview about his latest 
work Araguaia: Depois da Guerrilha, Outra Guerra, (São Paulo, Editora Anita Garibaldi, 2012). 
25 Camponeses do Araguaia — a Guerrilha vista por dentro, directed by Vandré Fernanes. 
26 The guerrilla members provided crucial services to the Araguaia community; they helped deliver babies, 
provided medicine and refused to accept payment for it, they helped the community build a school and 
brought in a teacher for them (Maria Lúcia Petit), see Camponeses do Araguaia. 
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importance of learning the mannerisms of the rural poor so as to create greater 
understanding of their lives before infiltrating a chosen area. This document betrays the 
(imagined) egalitarian disposition of the PCdoB; in urging the guerrillas-in-training not to 
ridicule the camponeses who still used herbal remedies and justified death and disease as 
the will of God, the document’s author creates a condescending caricature of the rural 
poor.27 They characterize the camponeses as ignorant and incapable of helping 
themselves. In addition, the author claims that this particular demographic is unaware of 
their strength as a group, that they are “always awaiting a leader (a great man) that will 
find a solution to their problems.”28 In judging the peasants for being passive actors in 
their own lives by waiting for a savior, the author also provides justification for the 
PCdoB to infiltrate marginalized communities. They construct communism (specifically 
the guerrilheiros) as the potential savior in this narrative.  
 The document goes on to outline the steps necessary for organizing and leading 
the peasants to revolution. These steps include, but are not limited to, gaining the 
population’s confidence and establishing good relationships.29 The creation of these 
social networks was thought to aid the guerrillas in their sustained growth and in their 
survival. While the PCdoB did hope that many camponeses would take up the fight for a 
communist revolution, they also had more realistic expectations from their new 
neighbors. In tapping into the residents’ sensitivity to revolutionary ideas, the party 
believed that these poor and miserable people could “supply and feed the combatants of 
                                                        
27 “Analysis by the PCdoB about a Rural Guerrilla (Análise do PCdoB sore a guerrilla rural),” undated, p. 
6. 
28 Ibid., p. 7. 
29 Ibid. 
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the people by whatever means they are able.”30 The relationships forged with the 
members of this specific rural society resulted in a sympathetic community allowing for 
varying levels of protection for the guerrillas: whether physical or in terms of protecting 
their identities and whereabouts. 
Despite long distances between neighbors, a characteristic of life in the 
wilderness, the paulistas were well known in the area. They would trade crops and 
livestock in the market, paid people like Joaquim for helping transport the goods they 
purchased in the towns, and had a general sense of camaraderie with certain residents.31 
This established network kept the guerrilheiros fed and hydrated during their standoff 
with the Brazilian armed forces. Some of the camponeses interviewed claimed to have 
fed and clothed the guerrilheiros secretly, and in some cases because they did not know 
the paulistas were being hunted by the armed forces.32  
                                                        
30 “Copy of the Study,” p. 4 
31 Joaquim mentions helping the guerrilla members transport supplies to their camp in Xambioá by donkey 
and Fogoió says he used to hang out with Osvaldão but does not seem to have approved of the political 
conversations with the paulistas, see Camponeses do Araguaia. 
32 Araguaia: Campo Sagrado, directed by Evandro Medeiros, documentary, (2011; Rio de Janeiro: Grupo 
Tortura Nunca Mais). 
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Figure 2: Joaquim talks about his experience living in Araguaia during the Guerrilla War. 
Source: Araguaia Campo Sagrado. 
 
Interviewees reject the notion that the guerrilheiros and those who helped them were 
terrorists, insisting that for all they knew the young revolutionaries were good people, the 
people who nursed them back to health and were integral in the delivery of their children. 
That bond is representative of the PCdoB’s knowledge of the area. Their study of the 
region allowed for an accurate analysis of the socioeconomic hardships and the areas 
wherein the insurgency could be most helpful.  
 The importance of an exploited, rural, workforce was central to the PCdoB’s plan 
for a socialist uprising. Though the party aimed to follow in the path set forth by Mao 
Tse-tung’s revolution in China, realistically its trajectory reflected a mix of Mao’s and 
Che Guevara’s theories. They combined Mao’s focus on the masses of the peasantry with 
Che’s “insurrectionary nucleus” tactic for creating the conditions necessary for a 
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revolution.33 Writing in 1967, the same year members of the PCdoB began infiltrating 
Araguaia, Ernst Halperin notes that as of August 30, 1963 the Chinese communist 
government had yet to recognize the Partido Comunista do Brasil despite recognizing 
another pro-Chinese Latin American splinter party five months later. An article in the 
People’s Daily criticizes Brazil’s revolutionary left when stating,  
The peasant question is a key question in the national 
democratic revolution of the Latin American 
countries…Brazil’s national democratic revolutionary 
movement has suffered a setback precisely because it did 
not have a broad united front with a strong leadership. It 
has not truly aroused and organised the broad mass of 
peasants and other sections of the peoples. Hence it could 
not organize a powerful counter-attack in the face of the 
armed rebellion organised by imperialism and its lackeys.34  
 
It is possible that such a bold statement coming from the Chinese government’s official 
newspaper galvanized members of the PCdoB to action. It also reinforces the choice of a 
rural location, such as Araguaia. The party viewed this peasant community as the best 
possible location for successfully carrying out the PCdoB’s strategic tasks; both because 
of the marginalized community and their exploitation at the hands of foreign businesses. 
  
                                                        
33 Ernst Halperin, “Peking and the Latin American Communists,” The China Quarterly 29 (1967): 124. 
34 Peking Review, vol. VIII, no. 19, May 8, 1964 in Halperin, “Peking and the Latin American 
Communists,” 145. 
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CHAPTER 3 
U.S. IMPERIALISM AND THE JARI PROJECT 
 
 The PCdoB targeted Araguaia in part because of the prominent U.S. business 
interests in the area and the manner in which the Brazilian military dictatorship allowed 
and encouraged their activities there.35 For the military regime, U.S. corporations could 
fulfill the long-held desire of incorporating the interior into the orbit of the Brazilian state 
and simultaneously extract its resources. However, as a communist group, the PCdoB 
was largely concerned with the capitalist-facilitated exploitation of labor. Given this 
inclination to support marginalized workers and the influx of mostly foreign-funded 
multinational corporations into the region through the SUDAM (Superintendency of the 
Development of the Amazon) agricultural projects, the PCdoB targeted Araguaia as 
susceptible to subversive ideology. Some of the exploitative projects under foreign 
control included the Jari Project and mineral mining by the U.S. Steel Corporation. Such 
projects exemplifies the kind of U.S. extractive ventures the guerrilheiros sought to 
expose and potentially destroy. I use Ludwig’s expansive projects in the area as a case 
study illustrating how the presence of such businesses fulfilled the military regime’s 
vision of economic development and validated the presence of the PCdoB militants in 
Araguaia. 
 Though these projects were largely under the control of foreign, usually U.S., 
leadership they were facilitated by SUDAM. This government agency was spearheaded 
by the Castelo Branco regime whose aims involved turning “one of the world’s largest 
areas of undeveloped land into a producing region that would supply the Western                                                         
35 Dória, A Guerrilha do Araguaia, 8-9, 30. 
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industrial nations with food, metals, wood and other raw materials.”36 SUDAM 
coordinated the programs, which provided tax incentives for corporations interested in 
establishing businesses in the region.37 This process led to the expulsion of indigenous 
and peasant families who had certain rights to the land they occupied. In a 1967 edition 
of the PCdoB’s newsletter entitled A Classe Operária, the party voiced its dismay as 
millions of peasant families were expelled while the “imperialist North Americans” took 
possession of vast national territories.38 The corporations interested in the economic 
development of the landscape relied on government support in order to remove the 
people from their land, leading to violent clashes between the military police and the 
camponeses. 
 Maria Helena Moreira Alves analyzes the conflicts over land in Araguaia in the 
context of the Doctrine of National Security and Development. This doctrine is a body of 
theory consisting of “ideological elements and guidelines for networking, information 
gathering, and political-economic planning of government policy.”39 The author 
illustrates the doctrine’s emphasis on linking national security to economic development, 
noting that rapid increase in economic development was thought to discourage 
communist sympathizers.40 This theory was directly applied to the Amazon region; 
General Golbery do Couto e Silva, a Brazilian theorist, was adamant about colonizing the 
Northwest of Brazil and flooding the Amazon region with “civilization.” He stressed the 
importance of development in the interior, and specifically in the Amazon, as a matter of 
                                                        
36 Jerry Shields, The Invisible Billionaire: Daniel Ludwig (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 
291. 
37 Alves, State and Opposition. 121. 
38 A Classe Operária, December 1967, 1. 
39 Alves, State and Opposition, 15. 
40 Ibid., 25. 
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national security — a means by which the government could plug up paths of penetration 
left vulnerable to subversive activities.41 The vast mineral deposits in the Araguaia 
region, found due to a joint commission sent to prepare topographic maps and air charts 
of Brazil among other tasks, provided an impetus for the implementation of the doctrine’s 
economic development component.42 
 Exhilarated by this recent discovery, the military dictatorship opened Brazil’s 
natural resources to foreign capital while still retaining control over the country’s 
economy. The regime’s economic model for development hinged on an alliance among 
the state, multinational, and local capital.43 The regime drew heavily on the Doctrine of 
National Security and Development, which claimed the primary objective of economic 
development was military defense rather than meeting the population’s basic needs.44 By 
firmly establishing the connection between economic development and national security, 
the military sought foreign capital as a means of transforming the mineral-rich region of 
the Amazon and Araguaia rivers into productive landscapes. Alves analyzes textbooks 
from the Superior War College, from which the doctrine was conceived, which 
“explicitly considers the contribution of multinational corporations to be by and large 
positive in the economic development of a nation, in spite of the fact that it may generate 
considerable internal opposition.”45 This rhetoric created a complex symbiotic 
relationship among foreign capital, national security, and economic development. 
                                                        
41 Ibid., 25-26. 
42 For more on the congressional recess that placed a legal framework for providing a system of fiscal 
incentives as a means of implementing the economic development of the interior see Alves, State and 
Opposition, 103. On the 1952 mutual assistance agreement signed by the U.S. and Brazil, and from which 
the commission mentioned formed, see Ibid., 120. 
43 Ibid., 27. 
44 Ibid., 26. 
45 Ibid., 26. Examining the Brazilian and U.S. views of the economic relationship between the two 
countries as presented by Roberto Campos and Lincoln Gordon, Andre Gunder Frank concludes that the 
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 Opening the Amazon to multinationals as a means of “developing” the Brazilian 
interior, allowed wealthy entrepreneurs such as Daniel K. Ludwig to capitalize on this 
initiative for their multiple business interests. Ludwig began discussing the possibility of 
bringing his businesses to Brazil with Roberto Campos in 1964, two years before the 
implementation of the SUDAM agricultural projects.46 Ludwig, anticipating a wood 
shortage, began conceptualizing his project in the early 1960s starting with the search for 
the perfect fast-growing hardwood and then moving on to scouting locations. The 
American billionaire had several business ventures across the globe during this time, so 
many in fact that the sun indeed never set on Ludwig’s empire. Drawing on previous 
experiences managing projects abroad, Ludwig had three specific criteria for the location 
of his next projects: 
1. A large tract - several million acres - of cheap, 
undeveloped land on or near the Equator.  
2. Access to a deep-water port (which he would dredge 
deeper if necessary).  
3. A country dominated by a friendly authoritarian 
government that would give him favorable tax breaks and 
other financial incentives, suppress any social unrest, and 
keep its nose out of his business.47 
 
Daniel Ludwig was rarely denied, his power and wealth were recognized and welcomed 
by the Brazilian government. In 1966, Ludwig met with then president Castelo Branco in 
order to discuss the Jari Project. During this talk Ludwig acquired a ten-year tax 
exemption at Jari, the ability to import equipment without paying import duties, 
permission to write off half of the taxes on profits from any other enterprise that Ludwig                                                                                                                                                                      
U.S. exploited Brazil “unmercifully” and ultimately stunted its economic development, see “On the 
Mechanisms of Imperialism: The Case of Brazil,” in Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader ed. 
Robert I Rhodes (New York: Monthly Press Review, 1970). 
46 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 286. Campos was active in the Superior War College (ESG) prior to 
the coup, see Alves, State and Opposition, 7. He pushed for an agricultural policy as a means of attracting 
foreign capital for the productive of export crops, see Alves, State and Opposition, 50. 
47 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 290. 
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might undertake in Brazil, and the freedom to carry out his project without interference 
from the Brazilian government.48 Upon securing these economic concessions Ludwig 
began turning close to four million acres of the Amazon rain forest into tree farms, rice 
paddies, cattle ranches, and mines in 1967.49 
 These business ventures highlight the exploitative nature of resource extraction as 
it impacted both land and labor. Ludwig’s vision consisted of leveling large tracts of land 
in the Amazon basin using tractors, bulldozers, explosives, airplanes and herbicides in 
order to create neat rows of Gmelina arborea trees.50 Much like Henry Ford in 
Fordlândia, Ludwig did not take into account the complex ecosystem in the Amazon rain 
forest.51 His biographer describes the species at Jari as being a part of “a staggering 
complex ecosystem that had taken half a billion years to evolve, and the survival of each 
type was inextricably bound up with the whole.”52 This complete disregard for nature’s 
will proved to be a fatal mistake for the Jari Project. The various life forms in this 
environment heavily contributed to the lushness of the soil in the region. Ignorant of this, 
Ludwig’s crew used heavy bulldozers, destroying the ecology of Jari, so as to make way 
for the tree plantation. However, after two years of clearing the jungle Ludwig’s staff 
soon realized that the very machines used to make their jobs easier had, in fact, packed                                                         
48 Ibid., 294-295. As evident in Autos and Progress: The Brazilian Search for Modernity by Joel Wolfe 
there is a distinction between productive foreign investments, such as auto factories, and extractive ones 
such as Ludwig’s ventures. This distinction mattered to the broader Brazilian public in that productive 
foreign investments brought forward and backward linkages. 
49 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 12-13. Ludwig’s project coincided with the infiltration of guerrilla 
members in Araguaia. Though sources vary, it is largely believed that Osvaldo Orlando da Costa arrived in 
1966. 
50 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 13. See also Daniel Ludwig’s obituary, Eric Pace, “Daniel Ludwig, 
Billionaire Businessman, Dies at 95,” The New York Times, August 29, 1992. 
51 See Warren Dean, Brazil and the Struggle for Rubber: A Study in Environmental History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Greg Grandin Fordlândia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s 
Forgotten Jungle City (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009) for an analysis on agribusiness' failures to 
“tame” the Amazon. 
52 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 297. 
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the thin, soft soil too tightly for the Gmelina seedlings to take hold.53 Thus while Ludwig 
intended to turn this supposedly “unproductive” land into a commercial space, his 
process inadvertently diminished the land’s productivity. 
 The exploitation of the landscape was intimately connected to the exploitation of 
laborers. Upon realizing that machines were only impeding his work, Ludwig hired men, 
called gatos, whose job involved recruiting peons from the slums of Belém and 
surrounding cities to clear the jungle using the “slash-and-burn” method.54 Due to the 
high unemployment rate in the region, the gatos quickly rounded up the two thousand 
workers necessary for the job. The vast majority of them lived in poverty and thus were 
unsurprised to be paid the minimum wage, however, they were unaware that the gatos’ 
fees and the cost of food would be deducted from their salary. The total amount deducted 
from their paycheck equaled forty percent, twenty for both the fees and the food 
(purchased from stores owned by Ludwig).55 In addition to being unfairly compensated, 
these laborers lived in deplorable conditions. They slept on unprotected hammocks, 
camped out in the jungle, with no way of escaping their work situation. Those that did 
manage to escape were either tracked down my Ludwig’s ex-military security staff or 
died in the vast and unforgiving forest.56 
 Brazil’s Maoist communist party vehemently criticized the harsh conditions in 
such fields of work. In the May, 1972 publication of A Classe Operária, an unidentified 
author asserts that in the north and northeastern states monthly salaries did not surpass 
cr182.40, roughly cr6.80 a day. This short article regards such a payment as a “salary of                                                         
53 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 299. 
54 Edison Martins, “Miséria em Jari mata ilusões de cinco mil peões,” Jornal do Brasil, April 29, 1974, 7. 
See also Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 299. 
55 Shields, The Invisible Billionaire, 308. 
56 Ibid., 308. 
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hunger,” maintaining that with every passing day it because more disproportionate to the 
cost of living and the workers’ necessities.57 In addition to identifying low salaries in 
relation to cost of living, this publication also linked inflation to latifúndios, meaning 
agricultural estates. Thus, in the section “O Latifúndio é Inflacionário,” the author 
reaffirms that the military regime:  
Estimula a instalação de grandes propriedades no Mato 
Grosso, no Amazonas e no Pará, através de incentives 
fiscais da SUDAM. O caráter ‘progressista,' ‘capitalista,' 
dessas ‘empresas rurais’ pode ser avaliado pelo emprego 
generalizado de trabalho semiescravo que nelas se verifica, 
conforme denuncias quase diárias na imprensa.58 
 
Pointing to the “semi-slavery” nature of labor in these rural enterprises, the author 
emphasizes the low wages and physical toll of such work. The author goes on to blame 
the latifundiários, the agricultural estate owners, for the increased cost of food in the 
country, condemning their export-oriented business strategy. Paradoxically, this article 
also accuses those latifundiários with expansive lands of lacking interest in exploring 
them “in an intense manner.”59 It does so to make the point that the mass-exodus of 
landless camponeses to the cities decreased the number of peoples engaging in 
subsistence farming and increased the demand for food in urban centers. Though not 
specific to Araguaia, these grievances were relevant to work conditions in the region. 
 The PCdoB considered Brazil’s military dictatorship responsible for the 
overwhelming presence of imperialist foreigners in the Brazilian economy. In a document 
analyzing lessons learned from the 1964 coup, an unidentified author opines that the 
military leaders known as the Sorbonne group were primarily interested in securing the 
                                                        
57 “Salário de Fome,” in A Classe Operaria, p.10, no. 64 May, 1972. 
58 “O Latifúndio é Inflacionário,” in A Classe Operária, p. 8, n. 64 May, 1972. 
59 Ibid.,, 1972. 
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interests of the bourgeoisie (who had links to “monopolist yankee capital”), the 
latifundiários and the North American imperialists.60 The economic concessions and 
autonomy guaranteed to Daniel Ludwig epitomizes the PCdoB’s grievances against the 
military regime; that they prioritized the interests of imperialistic North American 
businessmen over the basic needs of the Brazilian people. Furthermore, the dictatorship’s 
economic development model, based on an influx of foreign investments for resource 
extraction, both depreciated landless workers’ quality of life and rendered Brazil 
incapable of self-sustained economic growth. Analyzing the U.S.-Brazil economic 
relationship, Andre Gunder Frank claims that the composition of American investment 
and its effect on the structure of Brazilian economy was crucial to maintaining Brazil’s 
underdevelopment.61 Given that combating the exploitative nature of U.S. imperialism 
was a major tenet of Maoist communism at the time, the choice of Araguaia as the setting 
for a prolonged popular uprising seemed well founded. 
  
                                                        
60 “O Golpe de 1964 e seus Ensinamentos,” Comissão Executiva do PCdoB, August 1964, Centro de 
Documentação e Memória, Fundação Maurício Grabois. The Sorbonne group included Castelo Branco, 
Costa e Silva, Cordeiro de Farias, Bizarria Mamede, Décio Escobar, Golbery do Courto e Silva, Sizeno 
Sarmento, Muniz de Aragão and Ernesto Geisel. 
61 Frank, “On the Mechanisms of Imperialism,” 95-97. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TERRAIN, GENDER, AND MYTH 
 
 The oppressive working conditions in Araguaia, often at the hands of elite 
Brazilians managing poor and disenfranchised workers, provided a (supposedly) 
susceptible base for the PCdoB’s communist philosophy. Beyond this atmosphere of 
contention, members of the organization also considered the physical landscape as 
favorable to their cause. In a study of the region the group states, “In this situation of 
favorable terrain and a population potentially partisan of revolution, the guerrilla war will 
be able to accumulate forces, realize intense political work, thicken its combatant forces, 
maintaining local resources.”62 In addition to support from the residents, the guerrillas 
counted on knowledge of natural resources and terrain in order to survive in the forest, 
protection from heavy artillery due to the thick canopies, and the predictability of military 
posts along major roadways as the means for a successful insurrection.  
This section views the end of the guerilla war as one where landscape played a 
definitive role. Though the landscape provided an advantage at the onset of war, the 
military eventually overcame the jungle’s many obstacles. In fact, the Araguaia region 
was the perfect location for an insurrection. After all, sixty-nine guerrilheiros and the 
relatively small number of camponeses who joined them resisted large numbers of troops 
for three years. The Guerrilha do Araguaia did not fail due to location; they failed as a 
result of human error. Never having a chance to materialize their political and ideological 
mission, the guerrilheiros were betrayed when some of their comrades started having 
second thoughts. Nonetheless, even as the guerillas believed the landscape would protect                                                         
62 “Copy of the Study,” p. 4 
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them, the camponeses made certain among them part of that landscape. Locals 
mythologized compelling figures of the resistance into figures of supernatural essence 
that endure onto present.  
The PCdoB’s infiltration of Araguaia began with the arrival of Osvaldo Orlando 
da Costa, or Osvaldão, in 1967.63 Also known as Negrão or Minerão, Osvaldo was a tall, 
Afro-Brazilian man from Passa Quatro, Minas Gerais; he became the most well known 
leader of the guerrilla movement. Though Osvaldo was not as eminent in the party as 
Ângelo Arroyo or Maurício Grabois, he was the first to establish a relationship with the 
local population. Joana Almeida, wife of a camponês who joined the guerrilla war with 
their two sons, called Osvaldo the flower of subversion.64 Osvaldo was the most wanted 
man in the eyes of the military, his charm and friendliness with residents of Araguaia 
marked him as a major threat. He developed close ties with other residents near the 
Gameleira river, hunting with and working alongside them. In fact, Osvaldo has remained 
a powerful legend for the people of Araguaia. He is said to have had supernatural powers 
– the ability to turn invisible or turn into a rock. The myth regarding Osvaldão has been 
firmly entrenched into the local landscape. 
Like Osvaldão, Dinalva Oliveira Teixeira (Dina) also became a part of Araguaian 
folklore. Dina, “myth of a woman who never missed a shot,” was the only female deputy 
commander of a guerrilla camp – camp C. While a fierce fighter, Dina was also an 
integral part of the community. Despite having an academic background in geology, Dina 
                                                        
63 Sources vary regarding Osvaldão’s arrival in Araguaia. While he is known to be the first to install 
himself in the region Bernado Joffily dates this to 1969, while Dória et. al. claim that future guerrilheiros 
arrived towards the end of 1967. 
64 Bernardo Joffily, Osvaldo e a Saga do Araguaia (São Paulo: Editora Expressão Popular, 2008), 12. 
Osvaldão was introduced to the PCB (as it was known at the time) while studying abroad in Prague, with 
Eduardo Pomar, son of PCdoB founder Pedro Pomar, see Joffily, 29. 
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helped deliver babies in the Araguaia jungle. As part of such an intimate moment in 
families lives, Dina is held in high esteem among Araguaia residents. Dina arrived in the 
region with her husband Antônio in the early 1970s. In addition to delivering babies she 
and her husband owned a small business near Cigana in Pará. She, like Osvaldão, was is 
described as having supernatural abilities: superhuman strength, invincibility, and the 
ability to transform into a butterfly and escape enemy fire. This myth originated from an 
encounter with military forces during which Dina managed to escape with a bullet scrape 
on her neck after shooting captain Álvaro de Souza Pinheiro on the shoulder. However, 
the butterfly narrative became dominant in the popular imagination of the region.65 If 
                                                        
65 Hugo Studart, A Lei da Selva: Estratégias, Imaginário e Discurso do militares Sobre a Guerrilha do 
Araguaia (São Paulo: Geração Editorial, 2006), 55.  
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Osvaldão was the most wanted man, then Dina was the most wanted woman. Military 
forces hunted her from the moment they arrived in Xambioá. They traveled up a river 
going door by door in search of Dina and her husband Antônio with Pedro Albuquerque 
Neto as their guide. 
Figure 3: Osvaldão. Source: Patrimônio Histrórico de Passa Quatro. 
 
Pedro Albuquerque Neto arrived in the Cigana region (part of Araguaia) in the beginning 
of 1971 with his wife Tereza Cristina. Tereza, whose codename was Ana, objected to life 
in the jungle from the very beginning and though she refused to take part in their 
meetings, the young woman participated in military training and other activities that 
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involved walking through the woods.66 A smart, forward-thinking woman, Tereza 
becomes highly proficient in the trails surrounding the camp – planning for her escape. In 
addition to being generally unhappy in her situation, the leaders of the party decided that 
Tereza, pregnant at the time, must have an abortion. She was not the only one. Lúcia 
Regina de Souza Martins (Regina), who joined the armed rebellion with husband Lúcio 
Petit da Silva, was also quick to plan her own escape. Regina succumbed to a series of 
ailments, which worsened after an improvised abortion by her friend Sônia. During an 
approved visit to a hospital in Anápolis, Goias supervised by Elza Monnerat, Regina saw 
an opportunity to escape and caught a bus back to São Paulo with the money she had 
hidden away for this purpose. Regina arrived at her parents home safe although 
malnourished and suffering from a botched abortion.67 Meanwhile, Tereza and Pedro 
they were able to escape before the forced abortion. The couple managed to sneak away 
one afternoon when they found themselves alone at the camp. Catching a bus to Piauí, the 
two live clandestinely until February 1972 when Pedro was arrested in Fortaleza, Ceará. 
 Pedro’s arrest led military forces to Araguaia before the guerrilha were able to 
materialize their extensive plans. The PCdoB’s insurgency fell apart because the 
supposedly egalitarian party tried (and succeeded in the case of Regina) to violate 
women’s bodily autonomy. The protagonists of this narrative within a narrative were not 
the only ones affected by the commanders’ decision. Sônia had desperately apologized to 
Regina for the violent act she had committed prior to the latter’s escape.68 The gravity of                                                         
66 Morais and Silva, Operação Araguaia, 44. 
67 Ibid., 46-47. Regina and Tereza were not the only women whose bodies became controlled by the PCdoB 
militants. Criméia Alice Schmidt de Almeida had a son, João Carlos de Almeida Grabois, with André 
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the situation was also exacerbated by the arrival of military forces in April of 1972.  
Using Pedro, broken down by physical and psychological torture, as a guide, the 
Brazilian Armed Forces began their mission titled Operação Cigana (Operation 
Cigana).69 The sources regarding this operation in the region, combined with the 
PCdoB’s study of the area prior to installing guerrilla camps there demonstrate the extent 
to which the terrain proved favorable for a Brazilian peasant rebellion. Though the CIE 
(Centro de Informações do Exército – Army Information Center) had intelligence on 
subversive activity in the area, it was Pedro’s testimony that brought soldiers directly to 
the meticulously planned destacamentos (with particular interest in capturing Dina). 
These documents demonstrate the PCdoB’s planning and conversations regarding the 
physical conditions necessary for a successful insurrection. The military documents, on 
the other hand, serve to evaluate the PCdoB’s claims regarding the region. 
 Hoping that the physical landscape would allow for a trajectory akin to 
communist movements abroad, the guerrillas lauded the abundant natural resources and 
natural coverage as the key to defeating the regime. They believed that Araguaia’s terrain 
provided the optimal location for insurrection and that the fertile and mineral rich 
landscape presented an opportunity to sustain a relatively large number of combatants. 
Such a vast space would also provide accommodations for what they hoped would be an 
influx of revolutionaries from throughout the country.70 In addition, they felt that 
familiarity with the terrain and its resources would be particularly useful at times of 
powerful offenses by the enemy. If the guerrilheiros were placed in a difficult situation 
they would have the immense jungle into which they could escape and find safe refuge                                                         
69 “Relatorio Operação Cigana,” p. 1 
70 “Copy of the Study,” p. 4 
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from enemy forces.71 In fact the guerrilla engaged in training expeditions into the forest 
providing valuable knowledge of survival in the jungle for those accustomed to a more  
urban lifestyle. The mostly city-born college students would thus able to deduce what is 
safe to eat, orient themselves in the vast wilderness and find emergency provisions 
hidden in the trees (usually guns and machetes). The region was also thought to be both  
Figure 4: Xambioá Mission Report detailing the April 1972 mision. Source: Author. 
 
hostile and foreign to the enemy given that most of the incoming troops would be 
unaccustomed to such an environment. Arrogantly, the guerrilheiros believed that in 
order to “confront the diseases, the mosquitos, the bad weather, it is necessary to have 
clavate awareness and a spirit of abnegation that only the guerrilla has.”72 The 
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revolutionaries counted on their superior knowledge of their environment to survive and 
succeed in their quest.  
Military sources confirm this advantage. In a report of the Xambioá mission dated 
April 11, 1972, Captain Hamilton Ribeiro Saldanha de Menezes describes the insurgents 
as perfectly adapted to the area and having a profound familiarity with the terrain and its 
demarcated trails. The report goes on to explain that the equipment and footwear used by 
the guerrilla were in perfect consonance with the region and that the subversives have 
established a logistic support system aligned to their guerrilla principles.73 In addition, 
Captain Saldanha de Menezes notes that the troops’ own equipment was not adapted to 
the area; citing their backpacks as too big and their footwear and clothing inadequate for 
the environment and the obstacles they face in carrying out the mission.74 The guerrillas 
had, of course, anticipated this. They knew that the heavy equipment and military training 
did not necessarily prepare soldiers for jungle warfare. 
 The military forces also recognized the adversary’s social clout in the region. 
Captain Saldanha de Manezes, in addition to recommending better equipment and 
reconnaissance of the region prior to operations, also suggested providing elements of 
assistance to Araguaia residents so as to neutralize enemy support.75 It did not take long 
for military personnel to see the value of social networks between guerrillas and 
residents; such a relationship was first harmful to innocent residents who experienced 
indiscriminate violence from the regime. The PCdoB preempted such violence and thus 
their depiction of government-sanctioned violence became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
extent to which residents of Araguaia sympathized with guerrilla forces cannot be                                                         
73 “Relatório da Missão Xambioá,” p. 2 
74 Ibid., p. 3 
75 Ibid. 
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ascertained from the archival sources available. By providing classroom materials, 
teachers, doctors, and medical supplies, the Paulistas, as the suspicious newcomers were 
called despite varying origins, filled a gap left by incompetent and/or unwilling 
government. Though the government eventually accepted the importance of basic 
institutional funding in the region, the initial assistance by subversive communists 
appears to have resonated with the local population. This is evident in the Xambioá and 
Cigana mission reports. But to what extent do these sources represent those Gayatri 
Spivak would term “subaltern?” Is it possible that military personnel misconstrued fear 
for sympathy or unawareness for complicity? Or, in their raids of guerrilla camps and 
collection of written material, did government forces uncritically except the PCdoB’s 
narrative of their own importance in the region? This aspect of the history leaves much to 
be desired; specifically in that it hinges on the perspective of those whose voice are 
obscured by propaganda and self-interest. 
 The guerrillas predicted that the dense forest would set limitations on the 
movement of armed forces and provide coverage from heavy artillery. They counted on 
the lush, humid and vast jungle to restrict the type and amount of weapons used and 
reduce the effectiveness of straffing. The study of the region, conducted by members of 
the PCdoB, believed that helicopters and paratroopers would be ineffective in this 
region.76  While the PCdoB guerrillas accurately assessed the military’s lack of 
experience with the Amazon basin’s forestry, they sometimes underestimated their 
opposition’s technological might. A classified, undated, document summarizes the 
scouting mission in April 1972, Operação Cigana. This exercise allowed military troops, 
dressed in civilian garb, to both survey the land and test their equipment in the jungle. It                                                         
76 “Copy of the Study,” p. 5 
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also validated some of the PCdoB’s presumptions regarding the military’s disadvantage: 
inexperience with climate and transportation limitations. The aforementioned document, 
a report from the Army Ministry, relates the operation’s conclusions and 
recommendations for future missions. In addition to asking for more adequate clothing 
for the environment, the report also mentioned that helicopters were indispensable for a 
successful counterinsurgency. It cites, for example, it’s element for surprise – unlike the 
twelve to eighteen hour-long reconnaissance missions, maneuvers covered by helicopters 
lasted ten minutes and kept the target in “perfect physical condition” for an attack.77 
Helicopters would facilitate the locating process given that one of initial hindrances to the 
operation was incorrect information regarding the location of communist camps in 
Xambioá.  
In trying to locate the homes of guerrilla members, troops often alerted the 
guerrilla watchdogs, giving the insurgents plenty of time to escape into the forest as 
planned. During their reconnaissance mission in April 1972, the troops rented boats when 
traveling up the Araguaia River and traveled on foot in search of Dina and Antonio’s 
home.78 This mission must have utilized pack animals for the unknown author of this 
classified document also calls for instructions regarding the handling and use of pack 
animals, specifically as some of the soldiers suffered abrasions and rashes due to lack of 
experience riding horses.79 While the helicopters would help locate their targets, the 
armed forces could not rely on cars or trucks in the dense forest, as predicted by the 
PCdoB. They were also right about some of the weapons, which were in fact futile in the 
humidity. The report calls for keeping automatic weapons encased in plastic during                                                         
77 “Operação Cigana,” p. 7 
78 “Operação Cigana,” p. 2 
79 “Operação Cigana,” p. 7 
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reconnaissance missions, the use of smaller rifle for discretion, and notes that hand 
grenades stopped working after extended periods of time in the jungle.80  
The Araguaia militants were not necessarily wrong in their assumptions. Their 
knowledge of the landscape proved central to the war’s longevity. The vast forest allowed 
for somewhat easy escapes and maneuvering around the military’s predictable posts. 
Having friendship networks spread out over the region also proved advantageous, as 
guerrilheiros were able to stop by people’s houses for food and water before retreating 
further into the woods.81 Though only twenty camponeses ultimately joined the fight, the 
aid provided by Araguaia residents sustained a small movement for three years. Despite 
the fact that most of the guerrillas only had one year or two years to adapt to their new 
and foreign environment, the landscape provided enough safety and sustenance for 
survival. Militants such as Ângelo Arroyo, Micheas Gomes de Almeida, and João Carlos 
Wisnesky were the only ones to survive the war without first being imprisoned. The vast 
jungle allowed for their survival and escape. 
  
                                                        
80 “Operação Cigana,” p. 8 
81 Camponeses do Araguaia: a Guerrilha vista por dentro, documentary, directed by Vandré Fernandes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the guerrilheiros did not ultimately incite a mass popular uprising, their 
presence in the Araguaia region was nevertheless influential. The majority of the 
militants arrived in 1970 and 1971, meaning they had a short period of adaptation to the 
environment and of disseminating their subversive ideology before the war began. Thus, 
rather than evaluating the movement based on its long-term plans, an investigation of the 
PCdoB’s choice of Araguaia provides a more reasonable measure of success. Though the 
guerrillas correctly assessed the landscape’s physical impediments to the armed forces, 
the ideological characteristics presented a more complicated picture. The lack of sources 
from the camponeses’ perspective hinders a thorough investigation as to how susceptible 
they were to subversive ideology. It would be convenient to deem this aspect of the 
party’s decision as unfounded given that only twenty residents joined the armed 
resistance.  
However, the lasting influence of the Araguaia Guerrilla War necessitates a more 
complex study of the guerrilla war’s success. Though the members of the PCdoB were 
not able to carry out their prolonged plan of instilling communist sentiments among 
Araguaia residents, their acts of resistance were nevertheless influential in the area. 
Agrarian resistance continued in the aftermath of the Guerrilha do Araguaia. For 
instance, the Catholic Church became a major player in the defiance of arbitrary land 
claims that affected thousands of families.82 The struggle for those without land 
                                                        
82 A 1981 study by the National Conference of Brazilian bishops estimated that between 1977-1981 45 
rural trade union leaders and pastoral agents providing aid to peasants who were being evicted from their 
land were murdered,  
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continues to this day, particularly with the Movimento dos Sem-Terra (Movement of the 
Landless). Whether the influence stems from the guerrilheiros themselves or as a 
response to military repression in the area is less certain. 
 The presence of U.S.-based multinational corporations also complicates an 
evaluation of the movement’s success. The deplorable working conditions, such as at 
Jari, gathered national attention due to vociferous complaints from the rural laborers 
during President Geisel Médici’s visit to the plantation in 1973. Accounts describing the 
miserable social conditions in the area serve as an important source outside the 
communist perspective although in this case they reaffirm what the PCdoB viewed as 
labor exploitation (see fig. 2).83  
 
Figure 5: "Misey at Jari Kills Illusions of Five Thousand Peons." Source: Jornal do 
Brasil. 
Despite the egregious violation of workers’ rights at the hands of a U.S. corporation, the 
guerrillas did not receive mass support in their insurrection. The continued resistance to 
land grabbing and evictions indicates that anti-imperialist fervor might have been                                                                                                                                                                      
see Alves, 123. For more on the increased paranoia post-guerrilla and the repression directed at lay pastoral 
agents in addition to priests and bishop Pedro Casaldáliga see Campos Filho, Guerrilha do Araguaia, 167-
174. 
83 Martins, “Miséria em Jari,” 7. 
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prevalent but not as politically charged. If anything, the investigation of working 
conditions in Jari by the Médici government, whether genuine or not, implied national 
concern for the problem. 
 The existing historiography on the Araguaia Guerrilla War, though limited to 
Portuguese-speaking audiences, contains a wealth of information. Though documents 
produced by the PCdoB must be analyzed critically as they have clear political 
motivations, they are nevertheless valuable. While the documents available allow for 
considerable access to this history, many resources remain untapped. The interviews with 
military guides and camponeses who aided the guerrilla war and were subsequently 
tortured for their involvement often present a biased narrative. Through the course of this 
research I often found myself asking about the camponeses who did not agree with either 
the military or the guerrillas but who may have blamed the violence of that era on the 
communists. Ethnographic study of the area could lead to powerful oral histories 
regarding the guerrilheiros’ radicalizing influence and a more complex narrative. In 
addition, military archives have yet to be made public and what is available can only 
depict part of a much larger story. These particular sources could reveal why the armed 
forces responded to the PCdoB militants in Araguaia with such a heavy hand. Did they 
consider it a threat to the military regime as a whole or to the mostly foreign-owned 
businesses (and thus economic development) in the region? In other words, to what 
extent did the dictatorship consider the guerrillas to be a destabilizing agent? Fortunately, 
there is a possibility that these sources will become accessible as the truth commission 
continues to untangle the complex history of Brazil’s military dictatorship. Thorough 
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engagement with these ill-considered or inaccessible avenues could lead to new 
discoveries concerning the events in Araguaia. 
 The sixty-nine, mostly young, guerrilheiros who joined the cause had ambitious 
goals and an idealized solution to capitalist problems. Though these youths were 
overwhelmingly college-educated middle class students, and thus somewhat removed 
from those they sought to liberate, their advocacy for the landless and the rural poor had 
nationalistic intentions. Both sides of this oppressor/oppressed dichotomy were working 
towards a better Brazil, albeit by taking starkly different paths. And while the PCdoB was 
more apt to listen to camponeses, their voices are still relatively muted in the pages of 
this history. While the interviews of Araguaians in documentaries funded by the Maurício 
Grabois Foundation highlight some of these missing voices, it does not offer a 
comprehensive narrative of local response to the guerrillas. A less partisan historical 
approach to the Araguaia Guerrilla War could elucidate heretofore unheard narratives and 
indicate whether or not support for the guerrillas was as pervasive as both PCdoB and 
military sources indicate. Access to such information could provide a more thorough 
analysis of the PCdoB’s success in Araguaia and validate the choice of the region as a 
starting point for a rural, anti-imperialist revolution.  
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